ATTACHMENT 1

Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly

Tuesday, 8 December 1953, 2:45 p.m.
General Assembly President: Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India)

Madam President and Members of the General Assembly;

When Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to address the General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honour. That honour is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the general Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these sombre years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, of the courage and of the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men.

Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter. Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes. I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates, and on mine, for a great many months: thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us.Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know, I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course,increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all the Second World War.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States,the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago.Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage,

the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large programme of warning and defence systems. That programme will be accelerated and extended. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defence can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb doesn't permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defence,an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs fora surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defence capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor, for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste, all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hopes of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed, the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us from generation to generation, and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery towards decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction?Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the "great destroyers", but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace and mankind's God-given capacity to build.

It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive,not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom and in the confidence that the peoples of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life.

So my country's purpose is to help us to move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward towards peace and happiness and well-being.

In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience. I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act.I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps - now.

The United States and its allies, the United Kingdom and France, have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table. On the record has long stood the request of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany. On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian peace treaty. On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.

Most recently we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-Power meeting. Along with our allies,the United Kingdom and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable pre-conditions previously put forward. As you already know from our joint Bermuda communique, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results towards peace, the only true way of lessening international tension.

We never have, and never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what rightly belongs to it. We will never say that the peoples of the USSR are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a freer mingling of the peoples of the East and of the West - the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany,occupied Austria and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of the USSR. Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asis, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought

and natural disaster. These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent.

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored -an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In its resolution of 28 November 1953 (resolution 715 (VIII)) this General Assembly suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report...on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954.

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved", to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception. The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. The capability,already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds the people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

I therefore make the following proposal.

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith.Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding,storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.

Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing - it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for the conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second,begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiative at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress towards peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

I again thank representatives for the great honour they have done me in inviting me to appear before them and in listening to me so graciously.

ATTACHMENT 2

2 2005 NPT Review Conference

2-27 May 2005, New York

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an autonomous organization under the aegis of the United Nations.

In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower laid down a challenge that "It is not enough to take this [nuclear] weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put in the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace." It is time to "devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind." In the spirit of "Atoms for Peace", the Agency has for nearly half a century served as the world's focal point for peaceful nuclear cooperation and, through the application of its safeguards system, has ensured that nuclear technology serves only peaceful activities.

Aims and Activities

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is based on three pillars—nuclear nonproliferation; peaceful nuclear cooperation; and nuclear disarmament—and the premise that progress in any one pillar strengthens the integrity of the whole.

The IAEA's work also focuses on three pillars: preventing further nuclear proliferation through the application of the Agency's safeguards system; enhancing the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities as well as of other radioactive materials; and mobilizing nuclear science and technology to the benefit of all the Agency's Member States.

To achieve these objectives, the IAEA fosters research and development in the various peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including electricity generation and medical, agricultural, industrial and environmental applications. It assists most of its 137 Member States through technical cooperation programmes and promotes the exchange of scientific and technical information between them. The IAEA's work also includes setting the framework for cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an international nuclear safety and security regime and verifying States' fulfilment of their non-proliferation undertakings.

The IAEA thus continues to play an important role within the operating framework of its three pillars as a catalyst for sustainable development, as a cornerstone for nuclear safety and security, and verification of nuclear non-proliferation.

Verification

The Agency verifies States' nuclear non-proliferation commitments and provides assurances to the international community of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material and activities (http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/index.html). Effective verification is vital to the continued success of nuclear non-proliferation efforts. In this regard, the Agency verification activities ensure that nuclear material and facilities intended for peaceful use are not used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Safeguards are essentially a technical means for verifying a State's fulfilment of its commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as reflected in legal instruments such as the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaty arrangements.

NPT safeguards obligations

Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the NPT have the legal obligation to bring into force "comprehensive" safeguards agreements with the Agency that cover all of a State's nuclear material. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are also required by nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, which have thus far been concluded for Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia. Additionally, for each of the five NPT nuclear-weapon States (NWS), agreements known as "voluntary offer" safeguards agreements (VOA) are in force. These voluntary agreements—like those of the NNWS—are based on the safeguards obligations and procedures contained in Agency document INFCIRC/153 (Corr.). However, they apply only to nuclear material in facilities voluntarily submitted by the NWS concerned for Agency verification. The other type

of safeguards agreement, modelled on Agency document INFCIRC/66 Rev.2, is "item specific" and covers individual facilities, specified nuclear material, and/or specified items of equipment or non-nuclear material, and is applied in States that are not party to the NPT.

The verification-related objectives of the NPT are to ensure that safeguards are applied to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the NNWS parties to the Treaty and to provide assurances to the international community that these NNWS fulfill their non-proliferation undertakings. The Agency endeavours to fulfil these objectives through a system that is designed to detect, in timely manner, diversion of significant quantities (SQ)[1] of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices, and to deter such diversion by the risk of early detection. However, these objectives cannot be fulfilled without the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements by the States.

The basic features of the Agency's traditional safeguards system are:

- *nuclear material accounting*, through which, on the basis of information provided primarily by the State, the Agency establishes an initial inventory of nuclear material in the State, and records subsequent changes to it;
- *containment and surveillance measures* to monitor access to and movement of nuclear material; and
- *on-site inspections and visits* during which Agency inspectors have the right to carry out a variety of measures (such as verifying facility design information; examining records; taking measurements and samples of nuclear material for IAEA analysis; and verifying the functioning and calibration of instruments) for the purpose of verifying the correctness and completeness of States' declarations concerning nuclear materials accountancy and their nuclear programmes.

On-site inspections are the most important practical feature of comprehensive safeguards agreements. Inspections are of three types: ad hoc, routine and special. Ad hoc and routine inspections constitute the bulk of Agency inspections. They ensure IAEA access to nuclear material and operating records and to locations where nuclear material is, or may be, used or stored. Special inspections have been exceptional and may be prompted by the State itself, or by the IAEA, if the Agency considers that information made available by the State is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the relevant safeguards agreement.

Strengthening the Agency's safeguards system

Since their inception, Agency safeguards have continually evolved, taking into account both changes in technology and specific verification-related challenges that have arisen. The principal impetus behind what has become known as the strengthened safeguards system was the discovery of Iraq's clandestine uranium enrichment and nuclear-weapons programmes. These revelations in 1991 highlighted the shortcomings of the traditional safeguards system. At that time, the Agency's Board of Governors agreed that the system would henceforth have to provide assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities. To do this, the safeguards system had to move beyond its traditional focus on the "correctness" of a State's declarations concerning nuclear material and activities to incorporate more qualitative assessments of the "completeness" of a State's declarations.

The IAEA began to introduce safeguards strengthening measures in 1992. The focus of these strengthening measures was on obtaining more information from States about their nuclear material, facilities and plans, on gaining more access to locations at which nuclear material is or could be present, and on using new verification technology.

Between 1993 and 1995, the Agency developed further measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. Some of the measures could be implemented under the legal authority already conferred upon the Agency in comprehensive safeguards agreements. Others required additional legal authority. To this end, in June 1996, the Board of Governors decided to establish an open-ended Committee to negotiate a legal instrument that would provide that authority. The Committee negotiated the text of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements between States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards, which the Board of Governors approved in May 1997 (and subsequently published as IAEA document INFCIRC/540(Corr.)). The Board requested the Director General, *inter alia*, to use

[1] A significant quantity is the approximate quantity of any given type of nuclear material, which, taking into account any conversion process involved is required for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The timely detection of diversion is a reference to the maximum time-frame within which the Agency seeks to detect any diversion from peaceful use. For this quantification, the Agency looks at the "conversion times" required to convert different types of nuclear material into a nuclear explosive device.

the Model as the standard for additional protocols to be concluded by States and other parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

The Model Additional Protocol

The Model Additional Protocol is the key to a strengthened safeguards system and embodies powerful new tools to help the Agency verify States' compliance with their non-proliferation undertakings. Building on earlier strengthening measures, an additional protocol, in combination with the relevant safeguards agreement, enables the IAEA to obtain a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear material, activities and plans. Under an additional protocol, a State is required to provide information and access to the Agency related to: all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development; all buildings on a nuclear "site"; the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related equipment and technologies; long-term plans for the development of the nuclear fuel cycle; and broader physical access ("complementary access"). The wider use of environmental sampling and the granting of one-year multiple-entry visas to inspectors are some of the technical and administrative tools that ensure the robustness of the strengthened system.

By representing an advantageous balance between the rights and obligations of the State and the Agency, the additional protocol is fast becoming the safeguards standard. While a State concluding an additional protocol incurs certain additional obligations, the State's rights are protected through the Agency's obligation: not to verify in a mechanistic or systematic fashion the information provided under the additional protocol; to provide, within established periods, advance notice to the State in writing of requests for complementary access; to make arrangements for managed access upon request by the State; to inform the State of the activities carried out under the additional protocol, the results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies and the resulting conclusions it has drawn from those activities; to agree on Subsidiary Arrangements with the State, if either the State or the Agency considers it necessary; and to maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of all commercial, technological, and industrial secrets and other confidential information.

Integrated safeguards are the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve the maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. The Agency has focused on several aspects related to integrated safeguards, which have been implemented in Australia, Indonesia and Norway. State specific integrated safeguards approaches are under development for Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. In order to facilitate the implementation of integrated safeguards, the Agency has drawn up guidelines for unannounced and short notice inspections and for dealing with anomalies, questions and inconsistencies.

Status of safeguards agreements and additional protocols

There are currently 152 States with safeguards agreements with the Agency and 908 facilities under routine safeguards inspection. Of the 184 NNWS party to the NPT, 40 have yet to conclude or bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Ninety States party to the NPT have concluded additional protocols, 62 of which have brought additional protocols into force and it is being applied provisionally in two States pending entry into force. The increase in the number of additional protocols since the last NPT Review Conference in 2000 has been dramatic, with 42 additional States having signed such protocols and 53 States having brought them into force.

Comprehensive safeguards agreements are in force in 32 of the 33 States party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and in all of the States party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) and to the Southeast Asia NWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok). The Agency stands ready to assist States in the development of NWFZ involving safeguards verification—as it has done in the case of the African NWFZ Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which is not yet in force—including the possible establishment of such zones in Central Asia and in the Middle East.

The Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2003 reported that for 19 States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force or being otherwise applied, the Agency—having found no indication of the existence of undeclared nuclear material or activities—concluded that all nuclear material had been placed under safeguards and remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. In addition, for 125 other States (and Taiwan, China), the Agency was able to reach a more limited conclusion—namely, that the nuclear material and other items that had been placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. With regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, both of which had been

engaged in previously undeclared nuclear activities, the Agency found that both States were in breach of their obligations to comply with their respective safeguards agreements. No verification activities were carried out during 2003 in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) due to the expulsion of the Agency's inspectors in December 2002 following the DPRK's ending of the "freeze" on its nuclear activities. With regard to 44 NNWSs party to the NPT that had no comprehensive safeguards agreements in force in 2003, the Agency was not able to implement safeguards, nor could safeguards conclusions be drawn for those States.

Current verification issues

As indicated in the IAEA's report to the Security Council of 27 January 2003, and confirmed in subsequent statements of the Director General before the Security Council, the IAEA found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq between 16 December 1998 and 27 November 2002 when Agency inspectors had been absent from the country (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq/index.shtml). Since the inspectors' withdrawal on 17 March 2003, on the eve of military action, Agency inspectors have not been able to return to Iraq to carry out the Agency's Security Council mandated verification activities. However, the IAEA has continued to focus its activities on analysing the additional information collected during inspections; consolidating its overall information assets; and collecting and analysing a variety of new information, including satellite imagery, to update its knowledge of relevant locations in Iraq. With the support of Member States, the IAEA has also been able to continue with some of its investigations outside of Iraq, following up on inspections and subsequent analysis. These post-inspection activities have revealed no evidence of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.

In resolution 1546 (2004), the Security Council, *inter alia*, reaffirmed its intention to revisit the mandate of the Agency in Iraq. Given the level of instability in the country, and Iraq's past nuclear weapon-related activities and capabilities, it is important and urgent that a credible verification and monitoring system be reinstated. The Agency's mandate in Iraq under various Security Council resolutions still stands and the Agency awaits the results of the review and further guidance from the Security Council. In the meantime, the Agency is maintaining its capacity in its Iraq Nuclear Verification Office. Once the security situation permits, it would be prudent for Agency inspectors to return to Iraq, to bring the nuclear file to closure and—through implementation of the Security Council approved plan for long term monitoring—to provide ongoing assurances that programmes related to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction have not been resumed.

The situation in the DPRK continues to pose a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/index.shtml). The Agency has never been allowed by the DPRK to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration—specifically, to verify that the DPRK has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT, and has, since 1993, been unable to implement fully its NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK. Since December 2002, the Agency has not been permitted to perform any verification activities in the DPRK and therefore cannot provide any level of assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material. On 10 January 2003, the DPRK announced its immediate withdrawal from the NPT. However, in a resolution adopted on 12 February 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors confirmed that the Agency's NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK remained binding and in force. The Board further stated that it was essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to verify compliance with that Agreement. The Board decided to report, as provided for in Article XII.C. of the Statute, through the Director General, the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations; and in parallel stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and its support for diplomatic means to that end.

In recent years, the Board devoted considerable attention to the implementation of Iran's NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml). The Director General has submitted seven reports to the IAEA Board of Governors, which has adopted six resolutions urging Iran, *inter alia*, to demonstrate full cooperation and transparency, with a view to enabling the Agency to deal with remaining open questions and unresolved issues. Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in December 2003 and has undertaken to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol pending its entry into force. Nevertheless, further cooperation with the Agency by Iran is required for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues such as the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran and the extent of Iran's centrifuge programme. In his report of 15 November 2004 on the implementation of safeguards in Iran, the Director General stated that, while all the declared nuclear material in Iran had been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted

to prohibited activities, the IAEA was not yet in a position to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. In a resolution adopted on 29 November 2004, the Board of Governors noted with interest the agreement between Iran, France, Germany and the United Kingdom with the support of the High Representative of the European Union made public on 15 November 2004, and welcomed the fact that Iran had decided to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The Board underlined that the full and sustained implementation of this suspension, which is a voluntary, non-legally-binding confidence-building measure, to be verified by the IAEA, is essential to addressing outstanding issues.

As a result of its verification activities in 2004, the IAEA confirmed that, for many years, Libya had pursued a clandestine programme of uranium conversion and enrichment (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaLibya/index.shtml). The Director General's report of 1 June 2004 to the Board of Governors stated that, starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the end of 2003, Libya had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Libya and the subsequent processing and use of the material, as well as with regard to the declaration of facilities and other locations where the material had been stored and processed. The report also stated that Libya had received documents related to nuclear weapon design and fabrication. Libya has begun to take steps to dismantle and eliminate its equipment, materials and programmes related to the production of nuclear weapons in a manner verifiable by the Agency. The Agency's assessments of Libya's declarations concerning its uranium conversion programme, enrichment programme and other past nuclear related activities appear to be consistent with the information available to, and verified by, the Agency. While Libya has shown good cooperation, there are still some areas related to the acquisition of uranium hexaflouride, uranium conversion technology and enrichment technology that need further investigation in order for the IAEA to verify the completeness and correctness of Libya's declarations. These investigations are ongoing. Libya signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in March 2004 and has undertaken to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol pending its entry into force.

On 23 August 2004, the Republic of Korea (ROK) informed the Agency that in June of 2004 the Government had discovered that laboratory-scale experiments involving the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium had been conducted by scientists at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in 2000. In his report to the Board of Governors of 11 November 2004, the Director General indicated that the Agency had found that, on a number of occasions, starting in 1982 and continuing until 2000, the ROK had conducted experiments and activities involving uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, and plutonium separation, which it had failed to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligations under its safeguards agreement. The report further stated that, although the quantities of nuclear material involved had not been significant, the nature of the activities and the failures by the ROK to report these activities in a timely manner were a matter of serious concern. However, based on the information provided by the ROK and the verification activities carried out by the Agency to date, there was no indication that the undeclared experiments had continued. At its session on 26 November 2004, the Board of Governors concluded that it shared the Director General's view that, given the nature of the nuclear activities described in his report, the failure of the ROK to report these activities in accordance with its safeguards agreement was of serious concern. The Agency will continue the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the ROK's declarations pursuant to its safeguards agreement and additional protocol.

Nuclear Technology

The bargain underlying the IAEA's creation in 1957 presaged the central bargain of the NPT—countries choosing not to develop nuclear weapons would get international support and assistance for all peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article II of the Agency's Statute, 'Objective', reads, in its entirety,

> "The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."

The principal peaceful benefit that the founders had in mind was nuclear power. And nuclear power still remains the most prominent peaceful application of nuclear energy and the one with the greatest quantifiable economic benefit.

There are today 440 nuclear power plants in 30 countries providing 16% of the world's electricity. Most are in developed countries. France gets 78% of its electricity from nuclear power. For Sweden the figure is 50%. For Switzerland and the Republic of Korea it is 40%. For Japan it is 25%, for the UK 24%, for the USA 20%, and for the Russian Federation 17%.

Current nuclear expansion is centred in the Far East and South Asia. Of 26 new reactors now under construc-

tion, 19 are located in Asia. Twenty of the last 30 reactors to have been connected to the grid are in the Far East and South Asia. Although China and India currently get only 2.2% and 3.3% of their electricity from nuclear power respectively, both have growing energy demands and significant plans for nuclear expansion. China currently has nine operating reactors and two under construction. India has 14 in operation and nine under construction.

The Agency provides support to interested Member States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening nuclear science, nuclear power, the nuclear fuel cycle and spent fuel management (http://www.iaea.org/ OurWork/ ST/NE/index.html). Recognizing that continual innovation is essential if a technology is to survive and flourish in the 21st century, the Agency also works to catalyse innovation in nuclear technologies. Finally, the Agency helps interested Member States, mainly in the developing world, to develop or enhance their indigenous capacity for comprehensive energy system planning consistent with their national sustainable development objectives. The IAEA is the sole UN agency building capacity in overall energy planning.

The Agency is also active concerning the front- and back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. It assembles and disseminates authoritative data on uranium resources, exploration, mining and production. Through published guidelines and technical documents, and through training courses and workshops, the Agency promotes best practices in uranium mining and production to minimize environmental impacts.

In addition, the Agency is the only independent and non-commercial organization that provides a forum for the exchange of experience and promotion of best practices on the technical, scientific and safety aspects of the use and reliability of nuclear fuel. Agency activities focus on the exchange of information, research, practical experience and best practices. They also promote harmonization of advanced methods for fuel design, fabrication and use among Member States with different reactor designs. They provide access to advances in core corrosion monitoring and control, and in validation and verification of national fuel performance codes.

The Agency's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) has 21 members—Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the European Commission. INPRO published an initial report in 2003 that outlined the potential of nuclear power and specified guidelines and a methodology for evaluating innovative concepts. In 2004 this methodology was tested through pilot applications in a series of case studies, and a final report on the updated INPRO methodology is to be published early in 2005. INPRO complements the other major international initiative to promote innovation—the US initiated Generation IV International Forum (GIF).

Research reactors

For nuclear research and technology development to continue to prosper, research reactors must be safely and reliably operated, adequately utilized, refurbished when necessary, provided with adequate non-proliferating fuel cycle services and safely decommissioned at the end of life. Moreover, since about 60% of the operating research reactors in the world are over 30 years old, ageing core materials and the technology of ageing management are priority issues in the majority of Member States with research reactors.

Among its other efforts to reduce proliferation risks, the Agency provides support to the RERTR programme, which stands for Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors. This programme promotes the conversion of research reactors from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel, suitable for weapons, to low enriched uranium (LEU), which is unsuitable for weapons.

Medical, agricultural, industrial and environmental applications

The Agency also works to foster the role of nuclear science and technology in support of sustainable human development in addition to electricity generation (http://www-naweb.iaea.org/na/index.html). This involves both advancing and exploiting knowledge to tackle pressing worldwide challenges: hunger, disease, natural resource management, environmental pollution, and climate change. Nuclear techniques boost production of tropical plants and combat insects and diseases. Nuclear tools improve the food safety and help to cut air pollution. Radiology saves the lives of cancer patients throughout the developing world. And many of these nuclear techniques are relatively cheap, simple to handle and offer excellent and often unique benefits in such areas as insect control, water resources management, human health, and environmental protection. The IAEA promotes the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to Member States with the appropriate infrastructure, including Safeguards Agreements, required to use the technology.

The Agency is bridging the technology gap by putting science to work for development, which requires

'capacity building' to train scientists and prepare institutions. Working together with bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental aid partners, the IAEA is contributing to the social and economic development of its Member States and delivering sizeable human benefits. The IAEA's main areas of activities are: research and development, which is conducted jointly through laboratories and universities worldwide; energy and electricity assistance to help countries plan their energy needs including nuclear generation of electricity and the Agency's technical cooperation programme which promotes research, adaptation and the transfer of nuclear science for meeting basic human needs.

Technical Cooperation

Through its Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP), the IAEA works in partnership with Member States using nuclear technology to assist them to achieve their major sustainable development priorities in a cost-effective manner (http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/default.asp). The partnership nature of the programme is becoming more evident as Member States develop their capacity and experience in nuclear technology. Now many more States are able to provide mutual support to enhance the application of nuclear technology and thereby contribute to improving the quality of life in individual countries.

Each year the Agency supports more than 800 technical cooperation projects worldwide with over 100 Member States participating in national, regional and interregional projects. The Agency's assistance is targeted to priority needs and provided where such technology is the most effective and appropriate, and the recipient Member State has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology safely. Much care is taken to ensure that nuclear technology is used only when a State has the necessary safety infrastructure to support it and, when nuclear technology can make a practical and unique contribution. In this context it is important to remember that developed countries use nuclear technology extensively in medicine, agriculture and industry. According to the Agency's Member States, the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology should be available to all States.

In 2003 the TC Programme disbursed more than US$73.2 million worth of equipment, services, and training. Support for projects involved 3,121 expert and lecturer assignments, 2,848 meeting and workshop participants, 2,107 participants in training courses and 1,411 fellows and visiting scientists. Of the assistance delivered in 2003, nearly equal portions of 21% were related to nuclear safety and human health; 16% was devoted to food and agriculture, 10% to physical and chemical sciences and marine environment. Water resources and industry received 9%, 6% went to human resource development and capacity building. Nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle, material technologies, disposal radioactive waste management technologies both received 5%. An agreement has been reached for a target figure for the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2005 and 2006 of $77.5 million for each of the two years.

Nuclear Safety and Security

The safety and security of nuclear activities around the globe are key elements of the IAEA's mandate (http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SS/index.html). This includes the emphasis on defence in depth, risk management and international cooperation. It also comprises of a concerted drive to upgrade facilities with older design features. The IAEA also assists developing Member States in establishing a solid radiation protection infrastructure. A further emphasis has been on the safety and security of the transport of nuclear material. Particularly in recent years, further strengthening physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and enhancing the security of nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide have constituted a dual focus of the IAEA's work. Despite the considerable progress achieved, maintaining an effective and transparent global nuclear safety and security regime remains of paramount importance.

The adoption of four safety related conventions since the Chernobyl accident has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing nuclear safety worldwide. Nonetheless, there is a need to further strengthen the nuclear legal regime. In July 2004, the Director General circulated proposed amendments to the 1979 *Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM) to all States Parties with a view to extending its scope to cover, *inter alia*, the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes not only in international transport and storage, but also in domestic transport, storage, and use; it should also include the protection against sabotage of nuclear material and facilities used for peaceful purposes.

Apart from this framework of safety and security conventions, the IAEA establishes nuclear safety standards as the global reference for protecting people and the environment. International safety standards exist for nuclear power plants, research reactors, radioactive waste management, for the transport of radioactive materials, and for the use of radiation and radioactive materials in medicine, industry and research. Where appropriate, these safety standards are co-sponsored by other relevant international organizations.

All countries receiving IAEA support for projects must adhere to these safety standards. The IAEA contributes towards the application of these standards by:

- rendering safety services on request;
- by fostering international information exchange on safety;
- by promoting education and training in relevant subjects; and
- by providing safety related assistance.

As a central body for international information exchange, the IAEA organizes conferences and seminars, and produces a wide range of publications increasingly also through the Internet. In the event of a radiological emergency or accident, the IAEA is responsible for conveying authoritative information about the situation to all of its Member States rapidly. In addition, it is also the main coordinating body for the development and maintenance of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations. This plan lays out how each organization acts during an emergency response.

On nuclear security, the IAEA is meeting the challenges posed by the current security environment through its nuclear security plan. The IAEA has developed an action plan against nuclear terrorism within the framework of the nuclear security plan. The action plan covers three lines of defence: prevention; detection; and response; supplemented with activities in support of information management and co-ordination. It embraces advisory, evaluation, and training services, as well as legislative and technical support.

At the core of the action plan is the assessment of States' needs for improved nuclear security. Since 2001, the IAEA has carried out over 60 advisory and evaluation missions to help States identify and remedy their nuclear security needs. The IAEA assigns high priority to training and offers workshops in an international, regional, and national context, depending on the subject areas. The Agency also works to bring about universal adherence to, and implementation of existing international legal instruments relevant to the enhancement of protection against nuclear terrorism, including the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM) and the *Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*. International cooperation is also essential for identifying best practices to combat nuclear terrorism, as well as for knowledge sharing, resource allocation, information exchange and early warning. While coordinating its work with States and groups of States, which also provide bilateral security support, the IAEA facilitates the provision of physical protection equipment upgrades, as well as of equipment for accounting and for detection of nuclear smuggling. Additionally the IAEA provides information collected for its Illicit Trafficking Database, which compiles data related to the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. The IAEA also provides nuclear forensics support to Member States for the characterization of confiscated material through dedicated laboratories around the world, and it supports the upgrading of tools for the detection of radioactive materials in trafficking.

Financially, the extra-budgetary funding received by the Nuclear Security Fund has, in general terms, met the Agency's targets. The IAEA has responded with a very high implementation rate and in 2003 the Agency target was exceeded. The expectation is that in 2004 implementation will once again be at 100 % or above.

Governance and Policy-Making

The Agency consists of the General Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. The General Conference comprises all Member States of the Agency, each having one vote. The Conference normally meets once a year in September at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna (Austria).

The Board of Governors, which currently consists of 35[2] members designated or elected on the basis of regional distribution or technological expertise, carries out the statutory functions of the Agency. The Board usually meets five times per year at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna.

The Secretariat has six functional departments, each headed by a Deputy Director General: Nuclear Energy; Nuclear Safety and Security; Nuclear Sciences and Applications; Safeguards; Technical Co-operation and Management, and the Secretariat as a whole is headed by the Director General, who is appointed for a four-year term by the Board with the approval of the General Conference. The current Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, was appointed in December 1997. The IAEA

[2] The 43rd General Conference, which concluded 1 October 1999, adopted a resolution to amend the Agency Statute to expand the Board's membership to 43. This change will take effect once it has been accepted by two thirds of all Member States and once the General Conference has confirmed a list of all Member States, which has been adopted by the Board, by which each Member is allocated to one of the eight regional areas listed in the Statute.

submits annual reports on its work to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Secretariat has over 2200 professional and support staff from more than 90 countries. In addition to its Vienna headquarters, the Agency has liaison offices in New York and Geneva, as well as safeguards regional offices in Tokyo and Toronto. It also has two international laboratories and research centres.

Membership

Membership in the Agency is open to all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of the IAEA's Statute after their membership has been approved by the General Conference, on the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

In November 2004, there were 137 Member States. The IAEA's regular budget for 2004 was US$268.5 million and it is expected to increase to US$280 million for 2005.

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Information correct as of 23 December 2004.

ATTACHMENT 3

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so

desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.[1]

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

[1] On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3 in Fact Sheet 4).